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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DA YID E. BEAN, Administrator of 
the Estate of Alice A. M. Carlos, 
Deceased, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ARCHIE T. CARLOS, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
\'ERA EMELINE H 0 L L I S T, 
:MARY ALICE CARLOS and 
GLENN GREEN, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
10899 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying a motion 
to vacate a judgment based on an alleged stipulation 
for settlement of a suit to set aside deeds of the appel-
lants' deceased mother. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The trial court sustained the alleged stipulation 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal and an order directing 
the trial court to try the case on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 7, 1952, Alice A. M. Carlos owned the 
five parcels of real estate described in the complaint 
( R. 1, 2) and on that date she went to the Barnes Bank 
at Kaysville, Utah, and executed and deposited with 
the bank deeds conveying real estate to each of her 
four children, the defendants Archie T. Carlos, Vera 
Emeline Hollist and Mary Alice Carlos, and a daugh-
ter, now deceased, named Harriet Mabel Carlos Green, 
who during her lifetime, was the wife of the defendant, 
Glenn Green, who succeeded to her property. For 
convenience the parties will be referred to by their first 
names. The August 4, 1965 transcript will be referred 
to as (Tr. ____ ) and the April 19, 1966 transcript will 
will be referred to as (Ap. Tr ..... ). 
Two deeds were made to Archie covering farm 
and pasture property (Plaintiff's Exhibits 3 and 4). 
'Vith the deed to the farm property the following docu-
ment, Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, was attached: 
" ( 90) Ninety days after my death and upo~ 
deposit of ($5,000) Five Thousand Dollars, this 
Warrant Deed together with the Eleven ( 11) 
Shares of Davis and Weber Counties Canal 
Company water stock shall be delivered to Ar· 
chie T. Carlos. 
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The Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) thus 
<leposited shall be given to Harriet Mabel Carlos 
Green. 
The Barnes llanking Company of Kaysville, 
Utah is herewith authorized to make the above 
stated distribution. 
The 'Varranty ~eed mentioned above covers 
38.50 acres of farm land in Section 30, Tmvn-
~hip 4 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Merid-
ian. 
'Vitness the hand of said Isl Alice A. M. Carlos 
Grantor, this 7th day of Alice A. M. Carlos" 
April A.D., 1952. 
(Duly acknowledged) 
A similar document was left with the deed covering 
:26. l J acres of pasture land directing the delivery of 
the deed upon payment of $1,550 to be distributed 
to Mary, Harriet, Vera and two granddaughters, Nor-
ma and Gladys Carlos. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). 
All of the deeds and other documents were placed 
in an envelope marked "Carlos, Alice A. to family. 
No payments until death." (See Pltf' s Ex. E.) 
Mrs. Carlos died at Layton on March 12, 1959. 
Archie paid to the bank the sum of $5,000 and received 
the deed to the farm land, and paid $1,550 to the bank 
and received the deed to the pasture land. The deed 
to the farm land was recorded June 11, 1959, and 
the deed to the pasture was recorded February 29, 1960. 
On or about February 20, 1960 Archie's three sisters 
named above executed and delivered to him a warranty 
deed covering the pasture land. (Def ts' Ex. 4). By 
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deed, dated Feb. 26, 1960, Archie sold the pasture 1 
land to N oall Z. Tanner and wife. (Def ts' Ex. 5). 
On or about March 1, 1960, the bank disbursed the 
money which had been paid by Archie to his sisters 
in accordance with the directions of Alice A .. M. Carlos, 
contained in the documents referred to above. 
In December of 1963, Norma Parker and Gladys 
Fixel, granddaughters of Alice A. M. Carlos, filed 
a petition for letters of administration of Alice's estate. 
The petitioner prayed for the appointment of their at-
torney's brother and law partner, David E. Bean, 
as administrator. The petition was granted. (See 
Probate file No. 1722). The adminstrator filed this 
suit to set aside the deeds, not only to Archie, but the 
deeds to Vera, .Mary, and Harriet, claiming that the 
deeds were not delivered during the lifetime of Alice 
and were void. The attorney for the plaintiff was K 
Roger Bean ( R. l-5) . Archie filed an answer denying 
all of the allegations of the complaint except the alle-
gation regarding the relationship of the parties. (R. 6). 
One C. De Mont Judd Jr. represented Archie. Vera 
filed a cross complaint against Archie claiming the 
deeds to Archie were obtained by undue influence and 
duress and were not delivered during Alice's lifetime 
(R. 14, 16). Her attorney is K. Roger Bean, who also 
represents the plaintiff. Answers were filed by Mary 
and Glenn, who were represented by Milton J. Hess 
and J. Duffy Palmer. 
The trial of the case began on August 4, 1965, and 
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the transcript of testimony is in evidence (Defts' 
Ex. t). The transcript indicates that testimony was 
iaken during the forenoon. After the noon recess the 
following statements were made: 
"THE COURT: I understand, from confer-
ence with counsel for the parties in chambers, 
that the parties have agreed upon a settlement. 
ls that correct? 
MR. BEAN: This is correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to state the 
terms of the settlement into the record? 
MR. BEAN: We do, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may proceed . 
.MR. BEAN: If counsel will allow me, then 
they can correct me if there are any additions 
or changes. 
It is agreed, Your Honor, among the parties 
represented here, and other parties as will ap-
pear from the stipulation, that the present action 
may be dismissed with prejudice; that Archie 
T. Carlos will pay to the administrator the sum 
of $5,000, within 30 days. If there's a problem 
about raising that money, Your Honor, we'd 
be agreeable to an extension, a reasonable ex-
tension. 
That Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist will pay 
to the administrator, from a joint bank account 
in Barnes Banking Company, which we'll iden-
tify by account number in the written ~tipula­
tion, the sum of $1,750 each; that all parhes-
THE COURT: Is that the bank account re-
ferred to in .Mr. Blood's testimony-the savings 
account? 
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:MR. BEAN: Yes, Your Honor. The one in-
to which the proceeds were paid for Mabel. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
MR. PALMER: In that point, may we hare 
the stipulation that the balance be released equal-
ly to Mary and Vera? 
MR. BEAN: Yes. The balance in the account 
after this payment, it is agreed, is the propert~'. 
of Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist, equally. 
All parties quitclaim any interest in that same 
bank account to Mary and Vera. And it is stipu-
lated that Glenn Green also quitclaim any in-
terest in that same bank account, and agrees to 
quitclaim to Arch Carlos any interest in the 
lot which was deeded to Mabel, and that he also 
waives any right to any proceeds from the estate. 
It is agreed that the administrator will issue 
appropriate deeds to clear title to the 38.5 acre 
tract to Archie T. Carlos, to the lot which .Mary 
owns and occupies as record owner now, to 
her, to the lot which Vera owns and occupies, 
to Vera, and to the lot which was deeded to 
~1abel, to Arch. 
It is agreed that then from the 38.5 acre tract 
Arch will deed to Mary a parcel running the 
width of her existing parcel, and running west-
ward from the back of her existing parcel to a 
point one foot west of the existing sheds. 
Mr. Palmer. is that the best way to state that? 
MR. PALMER: I think so. 
MR. BEAN: All right. 
:MR. JUDD: That would be by quitclaim, I 
think, counsel. Is that correct? 
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MR. BEAN: By quitclaim. I'm sure that 
would be agreeable. Perhaps we should ask Mr. 
Palmer. 
Is that all right? 
MA.PALMER: I think that's all right. And 
get a deed also in order that there will be no 
encumbrance on the administrator's deed from 
the administrator. 
MR. BEAN: All right. 
Well, he'll already have that. 
MR. JUDD: Arch received that. 
(Inaudible discussion.) 
MR. BEAN: It is agreed that Archie and 
Mary waive any proceeds to estate property or 
assets, and that the division of the estate prop-
erty or assets shall be as has been agreed be-
tween Mrs. Norma Parker and Mrs. Gladys 
Fixel and myself, on the one hand, and Mrs. 
Vera Hollist on the other hand, and that they 
shall be the sole recipients of the assets of the 
estate. 
And it is agreed that each party shall bear 
his own costs. 
MR. PALMER: It is so stipulated. 
MR. JUDD: Mr. Bean to prepare the neces-
sary documents. 
MR. BEAN: It is stipulated that I will pre-
pare the documents, th~ deeds, for the admi~is­
trator, and of course wmd up the estate affairs. 
I shouldn't have to prepare Arch's deed to 
Mary, but I will, I guess. 
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lVIR. PAL.MER: I think that's noble of you . 
.MR. JUDD: So stipulate, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that your understanding, 
.Mr. Palmer? 
.MR. PAL.MER: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The parties, several of the 
parties are present. 
You all understand that to be the stipulation 
and the agreement for settlement? 
.MR .. JUDD: .Mr. Carlos, would you so state? 
THE COURT: I note .Mr. David Bean has 
entered the courtroom for the first time, and 
who will be bound by this stipulation . 
.MR. JUDD: .Mr. Carlos, would you state that 
that is agreeable to you? 
.MR. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: Well, on that 
part about that silo, what am I going to do about 
that? 
.MR. PAL.MER: I have already cleared that 
with him. 
(Inaudible discussion.) 
.MR. JUDD: You will have to move it if it's 
on the property, but you can wait until it's able 
to be moved . 
.MR. PAL.MER: Sure. 
l\1R. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: I don't go 
much for that. 
THE COURT: But you understand it to be 
the agreement, even if you don't like it; is that 
right? 
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MR. PALMER: You understand that. 
l\IR. ARCHIE T. CARLOS: I guess. 
(Further discussion off the record.) 
MR. H.EAN: May it be stipulated further, 
Your Honor, that we can withdraw the docu-
ments that have been put. in evidence, some of 
which are original deeds and-
.MR. PALMER: I have no objection . 
. MR. JUDD: I have no objection. 
THE COURT: The exhibits, then, may be 
withdrawn from evidence, if the parties with-
drawing them will receipt for them. 
The Court will approve the stipulation en-
tered into between the parties, and at this time 
would like to thank the parties and counsel for 
their effort and for their success in reaching a 
compromise settlement of this very difficult 
problem. 
I am sure of this: that a settlement does not 
meet with everyone's complete satisfaction, and 
that each party has had to make substantial 
concessions in their thinking, and in their estate, 
in their contribution toward this settlement, to 
make it work. If you didn't have to make those 
concessions, it wouldn't be a compromise settle-
ment. And so each of you have had to make a 
considerable concession in your thinking, and in 
your contribution, financially and otherwise, to 
make this settlement proper. But I am con-
vinced of this: that it's a better solution to the 
problem than the parties would have received 
by continuing with the trial. This way, you do 
have a tailor-made settlement that fits, in some 
9 
manner, the needs of each and every one of you. 
Had you continued with the trial, the result 
could not have been on a basis anything like 
this. It would have been an entirely different re-
sult, regardless what the result was. 
But I do commend the parties and counsel 
for their effort and help in this regard. 
Court will be in recess." 
(Thereupon the Court recessed.) (Tr. 43-48). 
A written stipulation purporting to set out the 
alleged stipulation in open court was prepared, signed 
by David E. Bean and K. Roger Bean and presented 
to Archie. He ref used to sign it. (See Deft. Ex. I 
and Affidavit R. 42). A motion was filed by the admin-
istrator for entry of judgment in accordance with the 
alleged stipulation made in open court. (R. 28). The 
motion was noticed for hearing on November 13, 1965. 
Under date of December 13, 1965 the court made find-
ings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment based 
upon the alleged stipulation. (R. 30-37). Archie had 
not heard of the entry of the judgment against him 
for $5,000 until about February 6, 1966. (Ap. Tr. 
p. 26). 
On April 12, 1966 Archie filed a motion to vacate 
the judgment dated December 13, 1965, upon the 
grounds, among others, that (I) the judgment pur-
ports to be based upon the pleadings and that no plead-
ings support the judgment, ( 2) that there was no 
stipulation for judgment actually made, and that no 
order of the probate court authorized the action of the 
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with the motion in which he stated that he had not 
orally or in writing stipulated for the entry of judg-
ment for $5,000 and that after the partial trial of 
the case he refused to sign the written stipulation and 
communicated it to his attorney Mr. Judd. (R. 42). 
At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judg-
ment, Archie testified that on the day of the trial he 
understood that :Mr. Bean had asked for $5,000 more 
than the $5,000 he had theretofore paid, that he told 
his attorney Mr. Judd that he wouldn't pay it and 
that he had not authorized him to settle the case. He 
further testified as follows: 
"Q. Do you know what a stipulation is, Mr. 
Carlos'? 
A. Never heard of it. First time I've ever been 
court." (Ap. Tr. p. 5). 
He further testified that he did not understand 
provisions of the alleged stipulation regarding waiving 
his claims against the estate: 
"Q. Now, Mr. Carlos, do you recall anything 
being said in open court here, or in a written 
stipulation that was submitted, regarding 
your waiving any claims against the estate? 
A. 'Vell, none that I know of. Any more i:han 
-I don't hardly get your question. 
Q. Well, did you understand that if a stipu-
lation were made in the form that was dis-
cussed in court, that you would have no right 
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to receive anything on your claim agains! 
the estate? 
A. Well, I didn't understand it that way. I-I 
haven't got too good an education, and I-
Q. How much education have you had? 
A. I have a Fifth Grade education. I was 
taken out of school when I was 14 years old, 
and been on the farm. I've never missed a 
year that I haven't farmed this ground since 
1914. 
Q. I think you testified that you'd never been 
in court before that day. 
A. I never." (Ap. Tr. pp. 26, 27). 
Mrs. Archie Carlos testified that she had met with 
her husband and Mr. Judd in the Jury room on August 
4, 1965, that she heard all the conversation at that time. 
"Q. I will ask you whether you made, or heard 
Mr. Carlos make any statement authorizing 
settlement of this case. 
A. He did not. He said, 'I won't pay for it.'" 
(Ap. Tr. p. 30). 
On cross-examinaton she was asked why she didn't 
stand up and say something at the trial and she said 
she was afraid to, "We were both afraid to." (Ap. Tr. 
p. 31). 
Mr. Carlos and his wife were cross-examined. No 
evidence was introduced by the opposing parties and 
the testimony referred to above is uncontradicted. 
The court denied the motion and made findings 
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to the effect that Archie knew a settlement was made 
and that he authorized his attorney to participate in re-
ducing the settlement to a formal stipulation in open 
court and to the further effect that the probate court had 
both authorized and directed the prosecution of the suit. 
(Ap. Tr. pp. 45-47). Archie appealed from the order. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. There was no stipulation for judgment. 
2. The alleged stipulation was not valid because it 
was not authorized or approved by the probate court. 
3. The judgment is void. 
4. The findings and order are not supported by 
any competent evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE WAS NO STIPULATION FOR 
JUDGMENT. 
The argument in support of this point will be 
divided as follows: 
( 1) Archie did not personally stipulate to the entry 
of judgment against him, nor did he authorize his 
attorney to so stipulate, ( 2) The parties intended the 
stipulation stated generally to be reduced to writing 
and signed before it become effective, ( 3) Archie 
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withdrew auy consent to the judgment before it was 
signed and ( 4) The judgment went beyond the scope 
of the alleged stipulation. 
(I) The record of the stipulation in open court 
which is reproduced verbatim in this brief should prop-
erly be considered in the light of Archie's knowledge 
and experience. He testified that he had nerer 
been in court before, and that he did not know what 
the word "stipulation" meant, (Ap. Tr. 5) and 
that he had had only a fifth grade education. ( Ap. 
Tr. p. 2{)). It will be noted that the proposed stipu-
lation was presented in "lawyer's language" in gen-
eral terms, and when the court asked Archie whether 
he agreed to it he said, "'Veil on that part about that 
silo, what am I going to do about that?" (Tr. p. 4{i). 
His only other comments were, "I don't go much for 
that", and "I guess", which from the context clearly 
referred to the discussion about the silo. (Tr. p. 47). 
At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judgment, 
Archie said, ""Tell, I didn't know it had been settled." 
(Ap. Tr. p. 4). 
A careful reading of the transcript reproduced m 
this brief will not disclosed a stated agreement to 
the proposal by either Mr. Judd or by Archie. Mr. 
Judd asked Archie to state that he stipulated and 
Archie aYoided the question by mentioning the silo and 
then he said, "I guess." (Tr. 46, 47). 
The law is well settled that a stipulation for a 
judgment must meet very exacting standards of clarity 
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so that it is certain that the parties had an understand-
ing of what they were doing. The rule is stated as 
follows: 
"The consent should be so clear and specific 
in terms that no mistake can arise as to the con-
currence of the parties." 49 C.J.S. p. 312. 
Testimony taken in support of the motion to vacate 
the judgment indicates clearly that Archie did not 
authorize his attorney to stipulate for judgment against 
him. He said in so many words that he did not author-
ize his attorney to so stipulate. (Ap. Tr. p. 5). Mrs. 
Carlos when testifying about a meeting in the Jury 
room with their counsel said that her husband told his 
attorney, "I won't pay it." (Ap. Tr. p. 30). This tes-
timony is the only testimony in the record and it stands 
uucontradicted. 
( 2) 'i\Then the stipulation was stated into the rec-
ord it is clear that the parties intended to reduce it to 
written form as a basis for a judgment. "\Ve quote: 
"That Mary Carlos and Vera Hollist will pay 
to the administrator from a joint bank account 
in Barnes Banking Company, which we will 
identify by account number in the written stipu-
lation, the sum of $1750.00 each ... " (Em-
phasis added). (Tr. 44). 
A stipulation was actually prepared and Archie 
ref used to sign it. See affidavit attached to the motion 
to vacate ( R. ·1<2) and also the unsigned stipulation. 
(Deft. Ex. 1). This clearly shows the intention at the 
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time the stipulation was made in open court that it 
was preliminary, and not intended to be effective until 
signed by the parties. 
( 3) If we assume only for the sake of argument 
that Archie stipulated for judgment, then his refusal 
to sign the written stipulation which was presented con-
stituted a withdrawal of his consent to the entry of 
judgment. The law is clear that consent to a stipulated 
judgment may be withdrawn at any time prior to the 
entry of judgment. 
llurneman v. Heaton (Texas) 240 S.\V. 2d 
288 
Lee v. Rhodes, 227 N.C. 240, 41 S.E. 2d 747 
Rodriquez v. Rodriquez, 224 N.C. 27.5, 29 
S.E. 2d 901 
Jacobs v. Steinbrink, 273 N.Y.S. 498, 242 
App. Div 197 
49 C.J.S. p. 312 
In Jacobs v. Steinbrink, supra, the court said: 
"The entry of judgment as the result of 'con· 
ciliation' rests on consent alone, and that con· 
sent obtains at the time of the entry of the judg· 
ment. It may be withdrawn at any time prior 
to the entry of judgment, and it has been with· 
drawn in this case." 
In the Burneman case cited above the court held 
that a judgment based upon a withdrawn consent was 
absolutely void. 
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At the time the judgment was signed the respond-
euts and the court knew that Archie had withdrawn 
whatever consent he had given, which we sincerely 
contend was no consent. See the motion (R. 28) filed 
November 15, 1965, which recites Archie's refusal to 
sign and return the stipulation. 
( 4) The judgment went beyond the scope of the 
alleged stipulation in open court, as did also the 
stipulation in writing which Archie refused to sign. 
Paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 respecting the quieting of title 
and transfer of property to Mary are not covered in 
the alleged stipulation in open court. It was stated 
in open court that the adrillnistrator would issue deeds 
to clear title to the lands of Mary, Vera and Archie. 
(Tr. 44). 
It could have been properly assumed by Archie 
that the execution of the deeds by the administrator 
would be authorized by the probate court after peti-
tion and hearing, which would have cleared his title 
as against the claims of the estate. Instead the court 
entered a judgment purporting to quiet Archie's title 
and to distribute the estate which went beyond the 
pleadings and the jurisdiction of the court. The argu-
ment as to the action of the court in excess of its juris-
diction appears under another heading. The judg-
ment contains a detailed description of certain land 
which it purports to transfer by order of the court 
from Archie to Mary. Archie has been married since 
1928 and his wife is not a party to the suit. Also, there 
is no agreement to the description. (Tr. 43-47). 
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There is nothing in the stipulation which indicates 
that the judgment would constitute a settlement of 
the estate of Alice A. M. Carlos and that all assets 
of the estate regardless of valid claims filed would 
go to Gladys Fixel, Norma Parker, and Vera Hollis!. 
The statement in court was that the assets of the estate 
would be divided as has been agreed between Mrs. 
Norma Parker and Mrs. Gladys Fixel and myself 
(Mr. Bean) on the one hand and Vera Emeline Hollist 
on the other and that they would be the sole recipients 
of the assets of the estate. The terrns and nature of 
the agreement referred to was not disclosed in court. 
The judgment states that Archie, Mary and Glenn 
agree that the property of the estate may be distributed 
to Norma Paarker, Gladys Fixel and Vera Emeline 
Hollist. Neither Norma Parker nor Gladys .Fixel are 
parties to this suit or to the stipulation. There is nothing 
in the stipulation or judgment which would protect 
Archie against them. 
Archie did not agree to the provisions of the judg-
ment, and this is a case of the court, at the obvious 
insistance of the attorneys and parties pressing for a 
settlement, making an agreement for the parties, in· 
effectunl as it may be to clear the title. 
It is settled law that a judgment must conform 
to the terms agreed upon by the parties and that the 
court has no power to add conditions or provisions 
on which the parties have not agreed. 
18 
49 C.J.S. 314 - Notes 38 and 39 
Edwards v.Gifford,137 Texas 559, 155 S.W. 2d 
786; People's Ditch Co. v. Fresno Canal and Irr. 
Co., 152 Cal. 87, 92 P. 77; Posey v. Abraham, 
165 Okl. 140, 25 P.2d 287. 
2. THE ALLEGED STIPULATION \VAS 
NOT AUTHORIZED BY THE PROBATE 
COURT. 
If we assume for the purpose of argument only 
that there was a meeting of the minds when the at-
tempted stipulation was stated into the record, an 
analysis of the facts and pleading will reveal the in-
rnlidity of the stipulation because it ignores the plain 
provisions of the probate code. 
The complaint alleged that the deeds which con-
reyed real estate to Archie, Vera, Mary and Harriet 
were void because they were not delivered during the 
lifetime of Alice A. M. Carlos and prayed that each 
grantee account for rents and profits and that title 
be quieted in the administrator. It is apparent that the 
deeds were either valid or void. If valid, the estate had 
no interest in the property. If void the estate owned 
the property and it could not be sold or otherwise 
disposed of, except in accordance with the probate 
code. If the alleged stipulation was based upon the 
assumption that the deeds were void and that the prop-
erty belonged to the estate it could not be sold to Archie 
for $5,000 (which is $5,000 in addition to the $5,000 
which Archie had already paid to his sister in accord-
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ance with his agreement with his mother, plaintiff'& 
Ex. 1 reproduced on page 2 of this brief) without 
following the statutory procedure for confirming the 
sale of real estate as provided by sections 75-10-1, 75-
10-2, 75,10-3, 75-10-11, 75-10-16, and 75-10-17, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. The same reasoning applies 
to the deeds to Vera, Mary and Harriet. The sales to 
Vera and _Mary were for $1, 7 50 each. Each to be 
effectual would have had to be confirmed by the order 
of the probate court after notice and the offering of 
the property for sale in open court to the highest bidder. 
If the stipulation is construed as settlement of 
claims of the estate the statute clearly requires authori-
zation by the court. See section 75-11-12 Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 which provides: 
"Compromising with debtors.-Whenever a 
debtor of the decedent is unable to pay all his 
debts, the executor or administrator, with the 
approval of the court or judge, may compound 
with him and give a discharge upon receiving 
a fair and just dividend of his effects. A compro-
mise mav also be authorized when it appears to 
be just ~nd for the best interests of the estate." 
This is not a case in which all interested parties 
have agreed to ignore statutory procedure, and in which 
all elements of notice and hearing required by law 
have been considered. Gladys Fixel and Norma Parker 
were not parties to the suit or to the stipulation, and 
obviously not bound by the judgment. The stipulation 
is not valid because the plaintiff as administrator had 
20 
no authority from the probate court to make the stipu-
lation. 'Ve shall discuss under another heading the 
lack of jurisdiction of the court to approve the stipu-
lation. 
3. THE JUDGMENT IS VOID. 
It is well settled law that a court may approve 
and act upon a stipulation for the entry of judgment 
if it has jurisdiction of the parties and general juris-
diction of the subject matter. 
30 Am. J ur. 254 
However, it is equally well settled that consent 
of. the parties cannot bestow validity on stipulated de-
erees beyond the jurisdiction of the court. 
86 A.L.R. 88 
Jurisdiction has been defined as : 
"The right to adjudicate concerning the sub-
ject matter in the given case. To constitute this 
there must be three essentials: First, the court 
must have cognizance of the class of cases to 
which the one to be adjudicated belongs; second, 
the proper parties must be present; and third, 
the point decided upon must be, in substance 
and effect, within the issue; 'Reynolds v. Stock-
ton, 140 U.S. 254, 268, 11 Sup. Ct. 773, 35 L.Ed 
464.' Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 1760. 
This court discussed the essentials of jurisdiction 
in the case of Stockyards Nat. Bank of South Omaha 
v. Bragg, 67 Utah 60 at p. 81, 245 P. 966, and con-
eluded as follows: 
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"It is fu.nda1:11ental .th~t .a .petition or pleading 
of some kmd is the Jus1d1cial means of invest. 
mg a court with jurisdiction of subject matter 
to adjudicate it, and a judgment which is beyond 
or is not supported by pleadings must falL Su 
too must a judgment or sequestrating order fall 
for other errors of law apparent on the face of 
the mandatory record, such as showing the judg-
ment obtained to be at variance with the prac· 
tice of the court or contrary to well-recognized 
principles and fundamentals of the law. A fact 
apparent from the mandatory record showing 
that fundamental law was disregarded in the 
establishment of the judgment, will render it 
null and void for all purpose. And a judgment 
founded upon such a record is subject to direct 
and collateral attack, and will sua sponte, be 
noticed by the courts and acted upon by them 
without regard to the wishes or relation of the 
parties named upon the record. In other words, 
all proceedings must appear to be coram judice. 
The views herein expressed are not at variame 
with the cases. (Citing many cases)." 
In the present case the alleged stipulation for all 
practical purposes settled an estate without all neces· 
sary parties present or represented, without statutory 
notice, petition or hearing of the matter of sales of 
real estate and without statutory notice, petition or 
hearing of the matter of distribution of the estate. The 
stipulation ignores the fundamental law and is at vari-
ance with the practice of the courts. Under the cases 
and statutes cited and discused above the alleged stipu· 
lation is void. As indicated under the preceding heading 
the withdrawal of consent by Archie, (if he ever gave 
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it) before entry of the judgment voided any attempted 
stipulation. 
4. THE FINDINGS AND ORDER ARE 
NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE. 
At the hearing on the motion to vacate the judg-
ment, Archie and Mrs. Carlos were the only witnesses 
who testified, and their testimony that Archie had not 
authorized his attorney to agree to a settlement which 
required payment by him of another $5,000 is not con-
tradicted. Likewise, the testimony of Archie that he had 
had only a fifth grade education, had never been in court, 
and did not know what a stipulation was at the time of 
the trial is likewise not contradicted. When the court 
asked Archie if he agreed to the stipulation he evaded 
and finally said "I guess." With respect to this statement 
it may have been intended to mean that he guessed he 
had to move the silo. He did not understand about 
waiving his claim against the estate. It is pretty clear 
that he did not know what "waive" meant. This tes-
timony with nothing to the contrary in the record clearly 
indicates entire lack of support for findings Nos. 4, 
5 and 6. 
"rith respect to finding No. 7 the complaint alleges 
failure to deliver the deeds and seeks the quieting of 
title in the estate. The answers to Archie, Mary and 
Glenn deny non-delivery and pray for dismissal. No 
counterclaim for quieting title in them was filed. Vera, 
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with plaintiff's counsel as her attorney, filed no answer 
but filed a cross-complaint against Archie confessed 
non-delivery and alleged that the deed to Archie 
was void beca"se the deceased was acting under 
duress and un<lue influence. It is apparent that there 
was no support in the pleadings for quieting title 
in the grant:oes named in the questioned dPeds, di-
vicling up money in certain bank accounts, ~ <l play-
in~·, fast and loose with the probate code-which :n-
cludes either confirming the sale of estate property with-
out notice or hearing, settling claims without author-
ity, or distributing the estate without notice or hearing. 
Finding No. 7 finds no support in the record. 
Finding No. 8 is a conclusion of law and it is 
clearly erroneous. Where a party to an alleged stipu-
lation withdraws his consent before the judgment is 
entered, he is not bound, especially where as here it 
was contemplated when the statement was made in court 
that a written stipulation will be filed. The law with 
respect to withdrawal has been discussed above and 
will not be repeated here. 
Finding No. 10 is not supported by the evidence. 
The file in the probate proceeding in the matter of 
the estate of Alice A. M. Carlos, No. 1722, is in evi-
dence. It discloses no order authorizing the prosecution 
of the suit nor the entry of the alleged stipulation. 
Finding No. 11 is a conclusion of law which is 
entirely erroneous. This proceeding is authorized by 
Rule 60b, which permits a motion to vacate a judg-
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mcnt upon the grounds that it is void or that it should 
be rncated in the interest of justice without a time limi-
tation. The time for appeal had already expired before 
Archie knew about the entry of jud~ment. He first 
found out about it about February 6.., 1966. See the 
April 19 transcript, p. 26. 
CONCLUSION 
lu view of the obivous lack of a meeting of the 
minds respecting the alleged oral stipulation, the lack 
of education, experience and understanding of Arch;e, 
his withdrawal of consent (if indeed any had been 
given) by refusal to sign the written draft of stipu-
lation before the entry of judgment, the judgment 
should be set aside and Archie should have his day 
in court on the merits of the case. Also, as a matter 
of law, a stipulated judgment which purports to 
either sell estate property, compromise a claim or 
distribute an estate with total disregard of statutory 
probate procedure is void and the order denying the 
motion to set aside the judgment should be reversed 
and a trial of the case on the merits should be directed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. J. SKEEN 
522 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
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